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Abstract: Previous research on CEO turnover indicates that a number of factors, including age, 
firm performance, and expected firm performance affect CEO turnover.  Measurement of 
expected performance in these studies is typically based on investment analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings; these expectations potentially suffer from a number of problems, including the 
tendency for CEOs to “manage” analysts’ expectations.  We examine the relationship between 
performance expectations and CEO turnover using data from NCAA Division I-A college 
football using a market-determined measure of expected performance, winning percentage 
against point spreads; this expected performance measure does not suffer from many of the 
problems that plague analysts’ earnings forecasts.  We find that performance expectations, actual 
expectations, and tenure affect CEO turnover in NCAA Division I-A college football, based on 
performance data from 102 Division I-A football programs over the period 1980-2004. 
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Considerable attention has been paid to understanding the factors associated with CEO turnover 
in the academic literature.  Much of this empirical research focuses on identifying observable 
factors related to firm performance that explain CEO turnover.  Important observable factors 
related to CEO turnover include firm performance in terms of stock prices and accounting-based 
performance measures, firm size, CEO age, and the presence of viable internal replacements.  
Brickley (2003) argued that, while actual firm performance appears to be a statistically 
significant determinant of CEO turnover, firm performance does not appear to be an 
economically important factor, because the size of the estimated parameters on variables 
reflecting firm performance tend to be small.  Rather than continue to refine and expand 
measures of actual firm performance, Brickley (2003) suggests future research focus on other 
factors related to CEO turnover. 
 
Subsequent research focused on factors like CEO pay (Shen, Gentry, and Tosi, 2010), the 
departure of other top management team members (Barron, Chulkov, and Waddell, 2010), 
performance risk (Bushman, Dai, and Wang, 2010) and performance expectations. Recent 
research on the importance of the performance of the firm relative to expectations in CEO 
turnover includes Holmes (2010), Franck, Nüesch and Pieper (2010), Engle, Hayes and Wang, 
(2003) and Farell and Whidbee, (2003).   
 
Previous research on the relationship between performance expectations and CEO turnover 
employs variables like 1-year and 5-year analyst forecasts of firm earnings as proxies for 
expected performance (Farrell and Whidbee, 2003).  While analyst forecasts reflect expected 
performance of firms, these proxies have limitations.  Farrell and Whidbee (2003) point out that 
analyst forecasts may reflect the ability of CEOs to manage the expectations of industry analysts, 
since CEOs’ jobs often include shaping public perceptions of the firm through influencing media 
coverage of the firm and the industry.  Information asymmetries and biases that affect analysts 
forecasts of firm performance also may limit the ability of analyst forecasts to capture expected 
performance.  Also, use of analyst forecasts limits the analysis of the relationship between 
performance expectations and CEO turnover to those firms tracked by analysts, typically large 
established firms.  Finally, 1-year analysts forecasts are available for relatively short periods of 
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 time, but performance expectations may take a relatively long time to form and be acted on by 
individuals in charge of evaluating, hiring, and firing CEOs. 
 
In this paper, we use a market based measure of performance expectations to analyze the 
relationship between CEO turnover and performance expectations.  We examine turnover in 
head coaches at NCAA Division I-A football programs, a position analogous to the CEO of a 
large firm, and the role played by the performance of football teams against point spreads, in 
order to assess the performance expectation-CEO turnover relationship.  The head coach of a 
Division I-A football program has a job similar to the CEO of a large corporation.  The head 
coach must determine a strategic direction for the football program, devise game plans analogous 
to making day-to-day operational decision, hire and manage a large number of assistant coaches, 
recruit players, manage large scale tutoring operations that keep players academically eligible to 
compete, deal with the media, and preform the role of public face of the football program.  The 
head coach must also interact with alumni and donors and ensure that the football program is 
both successful and stays within NCAA regulations.  Head football coaches at top programs earn 
salaries commensurate with corporate CEOs; top coaches earn millions of dollars per year in 
salaries as well as significant performance bonuses and additional compensation from media 
appearances and camps. 
 
Point spreads set in betting markets are unbiased forecasts of game outcomes and are generated 
in informationally efficient markets (Sauer, 1998), so the performance of a football team against 
point spreads can be interpreted as a measure of firm performance relative to a market-based 
expected performance measure.  The results of logistic regressions explaining CEO turnover 
indicate that both current performance and expected performance affect CEO turnover, and that 
the relationship between CEO turnover and expected performance is stronger than the 
relationship between turnover and actual performance.  While the result that current performance 
affects CEO turnover simply confirms the existing results in the literature, a clear link between 
expected performance and CEO turnover in this setting provides strong support for the growing 
body of evidence that performance expectations affect CEO turnover, and suggests that analyst-
based expectations measures are reasonable proxies for expectations formed by boards of 






Context and Research Approach 
 
Although a large empirical literature analyzing CEO turnover exists, relatively little theoretical 
research has focused on this issue.  Fredrickson, Hambrick and Baumrin (1988) developed a 
basic descriptive model of the CEO dismissal process.  This model identifies performance 
expectations, the allegiances and values of the individuals in charge of hiring and firing the CEO, 
the availability of viable alternative CEO candidates, and the power of the incumbent CEO as 
key factors in the CEO dismissal process.  Holmes (2010) proposed a Bayesian learning model 
of CEO turnover that includes a Bayesian prior distribution over the true ability of CEOs, 
learning about the true ability of CEOs by observing performance over time, updating posteriors, 
and, ultimately, a cost-benefit assessment leading to retention or firing of the CEO.  Franck et al. 
(2010) emphasize the risk-taking aspects of CEO turnover, in that firm performance following 
CEO turnover is uncertain, so evaluating CEOs based on expected performance may reduce 
incentives for CEOs to take risks.  In the context of the Bayesian learning model proposed by 
Holmes (2010), the risk taking aspects of CEO turnover raised by Franck et al. (2010) imply that, 
while a prior distribution describing possible alternate CEOs exists, the firm will only learn 
about the ability of an actual replacement CEO over time, and a poor draw from this distribution 
is possible.  This makes CEO turnover a risky decision. 
 
Franck et al. (2010) also emphasize the importance of expectation setting as an activity involving 
decisions under uncertainty, and use prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) to shed new 
light on the decision to change CEOs.  From a prospect theoretic perspective, the individuals 
who evaluate, hire, and fire CEOs --- the board of directors in the case of corporate firms and the 
athletic director and university president in the case of college football coaches --- must choose 
between two risky prospects: keeping the current CEO, who is performing below expectations 
but may return to meeting or exceeding expectations in the future, or hiring a new CEO who will 
have an uncertain effect on future firm performance.  Additional uncertainty is introduced 
because poor current performance relative to expectations may be attributable to factors outside 
the CEO’s control like general economic conditions.  The key insight of prospect theory applied 
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 to this setting is that the presence of uncertainty in evaluating CEO performance implies that 
both actual firm performance and performance relative to expectation will influence CEO 
turnover decisions. 
 
Frick, Barros and Prinz (2010) point out that CEO turnover can be viewed in the context of 
standard principal-agent theory.  From this perspective, the individual or individuals responsible 
for hiring and firing CEOs represent the principal and the head football coach the agent, hired to 
run the football program.  As Frick et al. (2010) point out, information asymmetries, costly 
monitoring, and moral hazard --- in this setting any behavior on the part of the CEO that 
maximizes the CEOs net benefits at the expense of the principal --- characterize the principal-
agent relationship.  Since the output of football teams can easily be observed, the potential for 
moral hazard problems appears to be mitigated in this setting.  In addition, the principal-agent 
aspects of CEO turnover do not reduce the potential for performance expectations to affect CEO 
turnover.  
 
The existing theoretical research on CEO turnover supports the idea that performance 
expectations play an important role in the process.  Clearly, identifying observable measures of 
performance expectations represents a key component of any empirical investigation of factors 
affecting CEO turnover.  In the literature in the corporate setting, researchers typically use 
industry analysts’ forecasts of firm performance as a proxy for expected performance.  Farrell 
and Whidbee (2003) discuss the positives and negatives of using industry analysts’ forecasts as a 
proxy for performance expectations.  Industry analysts have detailed information about specific 
firms, products produced, competitors, and likely future market conditions.  They examine all 
relevant public information about firms and develop forecasts of firm performance that are 
widely read and used.  A one year time frame fits with the typical short term planning and 
decision making horizon used by most firms, as well as the typical evaluation cycle used by 
corporate boards to evaluate CEO performance.   
 
However, a growing literature points out that many CEOs are expected to manage expectations, 
including the expectations of industry analysts, by influencing public perceptions of firms 
through interaction with the media.  Some recent research suggests that CEOs who successfully 
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 manage the expectations of the general public receive larger bonuses and earn more from stock 
options (Matusanga and Park, 2001; Aboody and Kaznik, 2000).  This implies that CEOs have 
an economic incentive to manage expectations.  If CEOs manage earnings expectations by 
selective release of financial information, “spinning” media accounts and other forms of contact 
with analysts, and if industry analysts incorporate CEO managed information into their 
performance forecasts, then industry analysts’ forecasts of performance may not be statistically 
exogenous to the CEO turnover decision, as unobservable factors that affect CEO turnover, for 
example the ability of a given CEO to manage earnings expectations,  could be correlated with 
industry analysts’ forecasts of firm performance, leading to statistical problems.  In any event, 
previous research indicates the performance expectations appear to be an important factor in 
explaining observed CEO turnover in the corporate setting (Brickley, 2003).  
 
The market-based measure of expected performance used here avoids many of these potential 
problems.  We assume that point spreads set in betting markets can be interpreted as a market 
based forecast of expected football team performance.  Sports betting markets clearly aggregate 
public information efficiently and point spreads have been shown to be excellent predictors of 
actual game outcomes.  Sauer (1998) thoroughly reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the efficiency of sports betting markets, and additional research has generally confirmed the 
presence of weak form efficiency in sports betting markets.  The point spreads set in betting 
markets should be insensitive to problems related to CEO expectation management that may 
plague industry analysts’ forecasts of firm performance in other settings.  Point spreads are set by 
book makers based on their expectations of game outcomes and the preferences of sports bettors.  
Sports bettors also form expectations of game outcomes when deciding which games to bet on, 
although other factors may affect their betting patterns, including behavioral biases (Levitt, 
2004) and consumption benefits generated by betting on specific teams (Paul and Weinbach 
2008a, 2008b, 2009).  It is unlikely that the CEO of a college football team is interested or able 
to manage the diverse performance expectations of book makers and sports bettors, who interact 
in a market that CEOs of college football teams do not participate in and are driven primarily by 
the desire to earn excess returns on bets placed on game outcomes.  However, both book makers 
and sports bettors clearly have incentives to form accurate forecasts of team performance and to 
take into account all public information that might help them to generate accurate performance 
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 forecasts.  A significant amount of public information on college football team performance, in 
terms of detailed game statistics, extensive television coverage, and in-depth daily media and 
blog reporting on teams and players, is available to both book makers and bettors, providing a 
rich setting for detailed analysis and expectation formation. In this sense, sports book makers and 
sports bettors have incentives that lead them to perform a role similar to industry analysts in the 
corporate setting, with the advantage that there are many more book makers and bettors forming 
performance expectations than there are industry analysts, and these book makers and bettors are 
interacting in markets that aggregate information efficiently. 
 
The performance forecasts set in sports betting markets, in the form of opening and closing point 
spreads on Division I-A college football games, and actual performance, in the form of game 
outcomes, are easily observable.  Book makers set point spreads on almost all games involving 
Division I-A football teams, and these point spreads are widely reported in newspapers and 
sports betting web sites.  The ready availability of performance expectations and the immediate 
availability of exact performance data makes it simple to determine when a team’s actual 
performance differs from expectations by comparing actual game outcomes to the expected 
outcome based on point spreads.  It also makes it easy and costless for the individuals 
responsible for hiring and firing CEOs to acquire this information, and use it when evaluating the 
performance of CEOs in this setting.   
 
A substantial amount of previous research has examined CEO turnover in the sports setting.  The 
closest antecedent to this paper in the literature is the recent paper by Holmes (2010), who also 
examined CEO turnover in NCAA Division I-A football.  Holmes (2010) estimated discrete-time 
hazard models of coaching tenure and retention standards, and found that recent team 
performance, performance in conference games, and length of tenure at an institution were all 
important factors for explaining CEO turnover.  He also reports evidence that being an alumnus 
of the institution, race, and violations of NCAA regulations played an important role in CEO 
turnover.  Holmes (2010) assumed that performance expectations were based on a Bayesian 
learning process, implying that recent actual performance can be interpreted as a proxy for 
performance expectations.  This paper extends the work by Holmes (2010) by relaxing the 
assumption that recent actual performance proxies for performance expectations and replacing it 
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 with a market-based measure of performance expectations.  We also use a different empirical 
approach, estimating logit models of CEO turnover instead of discrete-time hazard models.   
These two empirical methods share many similarities and can be thought of as analogous 
approaches for analyzing duration data (Greene, 2008, page 940.)  Also, logit models have been 
extensively used in research on CEO turnover, facilitating comparisons between these results and 
others in this literature (Powers, 2005). 
 
Franck, et al. (2010) perform a similar analysis using match level data from the German 
Bundesliga over the period 1998/99 to 2007/08.  Franck et al. (2010) also use betting market data 
as a proxy for performance expectations.  They analyze match level outcomes using a logit 
model, since intra-season CEO turnover is common in their setting, and use implied outcome 
probabilities from odds on the three possible outcomes in football games (home win, draw, home 
loss) to derive a measure of the expected points generated from each match, based on the 3 
points for a win, one point for a tie, zero points for a loss point system used in European football 
leagues.  Franck et al. (2010) report evidence based on these logit regressions that performance 
relative to expectations play an important role in CEO turnover in the Bundesliga in that CEOs 
who perform poorly relative to expectations, proxied by betting market outcomes, are more 
likely to be involuntarily dismissed.  Other recent research on CEO turnover in sport include 
Frick, Barros and Prinz (2010) who also analyze outcomes in the Bundesliga, Audas, Goddard, 
Rowe (2006) who analyze CEO turnover in the National Hockey League, and de Dios Tena and 
Forrest (2007) who examine within-season CEO turnover in the top division of the Spanish 
Football League. Earlier research was surveyed by Audas, Goddard and Dobson (2002).  These 
studies generally conclude that recent performance affects the likelihood of CEO turnover in 
variety of settings.  We extend the literature on CEO turnover by examining the role played by 





We assembled the data set used in this research from a number of sources.  Data on the 
performance of Division I-A football teams and the head coach of these teams were obtained 
from College Football Data Warehouse (http://www.cfbdatawarehouse.com/).  This 
8 
 comprehensive statistical archive of college football data is a standard source of information on 
team performance and head coach tenure.  We augmented data on team and coach performance 
with data on point spreads set by Las Vegas sports book makers.  Much of the early point spread 
data were collected from various print sources, including newspapers and gambling publications.  
In all cases we used data on the closing Las Vegas point spread from the Friday or Saturday of 
the week the games were played. 
 
The final data set includes data for 102 Division I-A football teams that played in the top NCAA 
football division continually over the period 1980-2004.  The final sample has 2,460 team-season 
observations.  Using the point spread and game outcome variables, we calculated each teams’ 
won-loss record against the spread.  For example, if Team A was a 7 point favorite over Team B 
in the final point spread and Team A won by 6 points, we counted this game as a loss against the 
spread for Team A, since Team A did not meet or exceed the expectations generated in the 
betting market.  In Las Vegas point spread betting, when a team wins by the exact amount of the 
point spread, the game is declared a “push” and all wagers on that game are refunded to bettors.  
In the example above, if Team A would have won by seven points, that game would be a “push” 
in the betting market. We counted all “pushes” as ties in our calculation of winning percentage 
against point spreads.  Because all wagers are refunded if the game is a “push,” many point 
spreads include half points.  For example, if Team A was a 7.5 point favorite over Team B in the 
final Las Vegas point spread and Team A won by 7 points, the game would be counted as a loss 
against the spread but if Team A won the game by 8 points, the game would be counted as a win 
against the point spread. 
 
We focus on CEO turnover, so identifying cases where a CEO (head football coach) leaves his 
position is a key element for this research.  In this setting, a CEO can leave a position for four 
reasons: to take a head coaching position at another Division I-A university or the position of 
athletic director at his current university, because he is fired or forced to resign, because he 
retires, or because he becomes ill or too incapacitated to perform his job.  Leaving to take 
another position at another Division I-A university can be interpreted as a promotion in this 
context, and we do not include cases where the CEO takes another head coaching position as 
instances of CEO turnover.  Being fired or forced to resign constitutes a case of CEO turnover. 
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 In some cases, the retirement of a head football coach can be viewed as CEO turnover.  For 
example, Florida State head football coach Bobby Bowden retired at the end of the 2009-2010 
season, but in subsequent media interviews he made it clear that he did not retire willingly and 
would have preferred to continue coaching.  This is an example of an involuntary separation 
where the CEO was not fired or forced to resign.  Because we cannot easily determine when a 
retirement was voluntary and when it was involuntary, due to a lack of complete information 
about many retirements in college football coaching, we treat all retirements as CEO turnovers.  
While this may introduce some measurement error into the CEO turnover indicator variable, we 
can control for this statistically if there is no systematic component to voluntary or involuntary 
retirement in this population.            
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics        
        
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Wins Last Season  6.0 2.9 0  14 
Points Scored Last Season     285 93 81  654 
Points Scored by Opponent Last Season  271 77 78  566 
Tenure at Current Institution  4.3 5.1 0  38 
Cumulative Win %  0.512 0.183    
Cumulative Win % Against the Spread  0.501 0.118    
Coach Separated From Team  0.137 0.343      
 
 
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis of CEO turnover.  Wins 
in the previous season, points scored in the previous season, and points allowed in the previous 
season are all measures of actual performance of the football team.  We do not use post-season 
bowl appearances as a measure of team performance because the number of post-season bowl 
games increased dramatically over the sample period, implying that the value placed on this type 
of successful performance might have changed from the beginning of the sample to the end of 
the sample; there were only fifteen Division I-A bowl games in 1980 but 28 in 2004.    
 
The next three variables capture characteristics of the CEOs in the sample.  Tenure is the number 
of years the CEO has spent at his current college or university.  Although the tenure spells are 
relatively short, the average employment spell in Division I-A is roughly four years, the right tail 
of this distribution is quite long.  Eleven individuals in our sample (Bill Yeoman, Bo 
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 Schembechler, Bobby Bowden, Don Nehlen, Fisher DeBerry, Grant Teaff, Joe Paterno, Lavell 
Edwards, Paul “Bear” Bryant, Tom Osborne, and Vince Dooley) coached twenty or more years 
at the same institution.  The cumulative winning percentage variables are calculated for each 
season in the sample.  Ties and pushes are not counted as wins, but are counted as part of the 
games played when calculating cumulative winning percentages; the cumulative wins variable is 
wins divided by total games played. 
 
Nearly 14% of the team-season observations in our sample represent seasons when CEO 
turnover took place in a Division I-A football program.  CEO turnover is distributed relatively 
evenly throughout the sample.  Only six instances of CEO turnover took place in 1987, 8 in 1995, 
and 9 in 1983.  At the other end of the distribution, more than 20 instances of CEO turnover 
occurred in 1996 and 2000, and seventeen instances occurred in 1982, 1988, 2002 and 2004.  In 





Following the standard practice in the CEO turnover literature, we estimate logit models of the 
determinants of Division I-A head football coach turnover.  The dependent variable, Y, is equal 
to zero if the CEO remained in his position after that season and equal to one if an instance of 
CEO turnover occurred.  While a Division I-A head football coach may occasionally be fired 
during the season, almost all CEO turnover in this setting takes place after the regular season has 
ended. 
 




x’β) = Λ(x’β)    (1) 
 
Where Y is the dependent variable indicating and incidence of CEO turnover, x is a vector of 
explanatory variables and β a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.  Λ is the logistic 
cumulative distribution function.  The unknown parameters of Equation (1) can be estimated 
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 using maximum likelihood.  Like most discrete dependent variable models, the logit model can 
be interpreted in the context of a latent variable model 
 
y* = x’β  +   e         ( 2 )  
 
where y* is an unobservable latent variable that in this context captures the expected net benefit 
that would be realized by turnover in the head football coach of a Division I-A football team.   e 
is an unobservable mean zero constant variance random variable that affects y*. We cannot 
observe y*, but instead observe Y=1 when y*>0 and Y=0 otherwise. 
 
We estimate two alternative logit models that contain different measures of current performance.  
The first model uses the number of wins in the previous season as the measure of current 
performance.  This model assumes that the individuals responsible for the hiring and firing of 
CEOs care primarily about winning when evaluating performance.  The second model uses the 
number of points scored and allowed in the previous season as measures of current performance.  
This model assumes that the individuals responsible for the hiring and firing of the CEO care 
about the offensive (scoring points) and defensive (preventing opponents from scoring points) 
outputs of the team when evaluating the performance of the CEO and not simply about wins.  
This is analogous to a corporate board of directors caring about costs and revenues instead of 
simply focusing on profits.  Both models also contain explanatory variables capturing the long 
term performance of the CEO as reflected in his cumulative winning percentage, and the tenure 
of the CEO at his current institution.  Cumulative winning percentage captures the overall 
performance of the team under the leadership of the current CEO.  We allow the relationship 
between tenure and CEO turnover to be non-linear. 
 
The key variable in the logit models is the CEOs cumulative record against the point spread.  
Again, we interpret the point spread as a market-based measure of the expected performance of 
the football team.  It is market based because point spreads are set in betting markets based on 
the interaction between bookmakers and bettors.  A significant body of empirical literature 
indicates that point spread betting markets are weak form efficient, in that point spreads reflect 
all public information available to bookmakers and bettors, and are good predictors of actual 
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 game outcomes (Sauer, 1998).  Since point spreads reflect performance expectations, the CEO’s 
cumulative winning percentage against the point spread can be interpreted as a measure of 
performance relative to expectations.  We expect that the higher a CEO’s cumulative winning 
percentage against the point spread, the better his performance relative to expectations, and the 
less likely he is to be fired, other things equal.            
 
Table 2 contains the maximum likelihood regression results for equation (1).  The first set of 
results are for the  logit model with wins last season and cumulative wins and measures of actual 
performance and the second set of results are for the logit model with points scored and allowed 
last season as measures of actual performance. Table 2 also shows the z-statistics for a two-tailed 
test of the  null hypothesis that the parameter estimate is equal to zero.  Stars indicate variables 
that are statistically different from zero at the one percent significance level.  The models explain 
between 9% and 10% of he observed variation in CEO turnover in this sample. 
 
Table 2: Logistic Regression Results         
            
  Parameter    Parameter    
Variable  Estimate    Z Estimate     Z
Wins Last Season  -0.261 * -7.63 ---   ---
Points Scored     ---  --- -0.006  *  -5.78
Points Scored by Opponent  ---  --- 0.004  *  4.12
Cumulative Win %  -0.121  -0.22 -0.661    -1.23
Cumulative Win % Against the Spread  -1.633 * -2.71 -1.461 * -2.44
Tenure at Current Institution  0.283 * 7.51 0.286 *  7.61
Tenure at Current Institution Squared  -0.011 * -5.44 -0.011  *  -5.49
Number of Observations  2460    2460     
Psuedo-R
2  0.098       0.090       
 
The results indicate that current performance matters for explaining CEO turnover.  The more 
wins a team had in the previous season, the less likely an instance of CEO turnover will take 
place this season, other things equal.  The probability derivative implied by this point estimate 
indicates that each additional win reduces the probability of a CEO turnover by 2.5%.   
Interestingly, previous performance, as captured by the CEO’s career winning percentage, does 
not appear to be related to CEO turnover.  The parameter on the cumulative winning percentage 
variable is not statistically significant in either model.  This suggests only current performance, 
and not long-term performance, matters to individuals who make decisions about CEO hiring 
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 and firing.  In terms of actual performance, it appears to be a case of “what have you done for me 
lately?”   
 
Current performance in terms of points scored and opponents points allowed also affect the 
probability that CEO turnover takes place.  Better offensive performance is associated with a 
reduced probability of CEO turnover; the probability derivative implies that an offense scoring 
an additional 100 points per season, roughly a 40% increase above average based on the mean 
reported on Table 1, would reduce the probability of CEO turnover by 5.5%.  Better defensive 
performance, in terms of fewer opponents points allowed in the previous season, is also 
associated with a reduced probability of CEO turnover.  The probability derivative on points 
allowed implies that giving up 100 fewer points per season, again a change of about 40% from 
the mean points allowed in the sample, reduced the probability of CEO turnover by about 3.8%.  
Offensive performance has a larger impact on CEO turnover than defensive performance. 
 
Tenure is related to CEO turnover in a nonlinear fashion.  CEOs with shorter tenure at an 
institution have an increased probability of involuntary dismissal, and this probability increases 
until the CEO has 13 years of experience at an institution, after which the probability of CEO 
turnover declines.  This is consistent with the fact that the average spell of employment in the 
sample is just over four seasons.  This non-linear relationship can be interpreted as the result of 
goodwill built up with the individuals responsible for hiring and firing CEOs, or as reputational 
effects which grow slowly over time.  It is also consistent with the discrete-time hazard model 
results reported by Holmes (2010). 
 
The primary parameter estimate of interest is the parameter on the proxy for performance relative 
to expectations, the CEO’s career winning percentage against the Las Vegas point spread.  Again, 
the larger this winning percentage, the better the CEO has performed relative to expectations.  
The results on Table 2 indicate that performance relative to expectations has an important effect 
on CEO turnover.  CEOs with better performance relative to expectations are much less likely to 
be involuntarily dismissed than those who perform worse relative to expectations.  The estimated 
parameters have similar magnitudes in both models; the probability derivative from Model 1 
indicates that a 0.1 increase in career winning percentage against the spread, for example an 
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 increase from a 0.500 record against the spread to a 0.600 record, is associated with a 1.5% 
decrease in the probability of turnover.  On average, CEOs in the sample played about 54 games 
against the spread and won about 27 of them (the average career winning percentage against the 
spread on Table 1 is just over 0.5).  To improve to a 0.600 career record, the CEO would need to 
outperform the point spread in an additional 5 games.  The probability derivative from Model 2 





Discussion and Extensions 
 
The results of the logit regressions indicate that both current performance and performance 
relative to expectations matters in this setting.  The probability that CEO turnover occurs 
increases with both poorer recent performance and poorer performance relative to expectations, 
as measured by point spreads set in betting markets.  This performance expectation measure is 
unlikely to suffer from the problems associated with the use of analysts forecasts of firm 
performance used in studies of CEO turnover in the corporate setting.  The expectations formed 
by book makers and sports bettors are unlikely to be influenced by CEOs as part of their job, and 
CEOs in this setting are prohibited from participating in betting markets so they are unlikely to 
care about the performance expectations that emerge from these markets.  However, the 
individuals responsible for CEO hiring and firing, athletic directors, university presidents, and 
university bards of trustees, make CEO turnover decisions in a way systematically related to the 
CEO’s performance against this specific performance expectation.  Since betting markets are 
weak form efficient, and efficiently aggregate all public information related to team performance, 
we should not be surprised that career performance against the point spread explains CEO 
turnover decisions in this setting. 
 
The estimated relationship between current performance and CEO turnover, as well as 
performance relative to expectations and CEO turnover, is robust to alternative specifications.  
We estimated alternative models that included only current wins and current winning percentage 
against the spread, and only cumulative winning percentage and cumulative winning percentage 
against the spread.  The results from these alternative specifications were qualitatively identical 
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 to those reported on Table 3.  Current performance, current performance relative to expectations, 
and cumulative long-term performance relative to expectations were all significant factors for 
explaining CEO turnover.  Current performance alone cannot explain CEO dismissals, implying 
that those responsible for CEO turnover care about both performance and performance relative to 
expectations.   
 
The results here suggest that other empirical findings of an important relationship between 
performance expectations and CEO turnover can be viewed as robust.  Commonly used measures 
of performance expectations in other settings, for example 1-year analyst forecasts of firm 
performance, appear to be reasonable expectations of firm performance, since these expectation 
measures, like winning percentage against the point spread, both explain observed CEO turnover 
decisions.     
 
Several fruitful extensions to this research could be explored.  First, Brickley (2003) pointed out 
that the age of CEOs is an important factor explaining turnover, and that the probability of CEO 
turnover occurring increases as the CEO gets older.  The current logit models contain only a 
coaches tenure at an institution, not age.  Tenure reflects factors specific to a coach and an 
institution, and factors like firm-specific human capital.  Age captures factors like human capital 
and reputation.  In future work, we plan to augment this data set with information about the age 
of the head coach, in order to assess the effects of age on CEO turnover in this setting.   
 
Second, since performance expectations clearly affect CEO turnover in this setting, and betting 
market based performance expectations data exist for a number of other sports, a similar analysis 
could be repeated in other settings.  Franck et al. (2010) perform a similar analysis in the 
Bundesliga in Germany, and report similar results to those reported here using match level data.  
Data aggregated to the season level can be used in this setting, because of the relatively short 
college football season and the institutional characteristics of the college football CEO market 
lead to bunching of CEO turnover and hiring in the off season.  However, CEO turnover in the 
National Basketball Association and Major League Baseball occurs throughout the season 
providing a different setting for examining CEO turnover. Also, the expectations of general 
managers and team owners in these professional leagues, with different organizational structures 
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 and goals, and different institutional characteristics, may lead to differences in the importance of 
current performance and performance relative to expectations.  Further research in these settings 




Aboody, D. and R. Kasznik (2000). CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate 
voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29, 73–100. 
 
Audas, R., S. Dobson, and J. Goddard (2002). The impact of managerial change on team 
performance in professional sports. Journal of Economics and Business, 54, 633-650. 
 
Audas, R., J. Goddard, and J. Rowe, (2006). Modelling employment duration of NHL head 
coaches: Turnover and post-succession performance. Managerial and Decision Economics, 27, 
293-306. 
 
Barron, J. M., Chulkov, D. V., and Waddell, G. R. (2010). Top management team turnover, CEO 
succession type, and strategic change. Journal of Business Research, 64(8), 904-910. 
 
Brickley, J. A. (2003). Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: a discussion, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1-3), 227-233. 
 
Bushman, R., Dai, Zhonglan, and Wang, X. (2010).  Risk and CEO Turnover, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 96(3), 381-398. 
 
de Dios Tena, J. and D. Forrest (2007). Within-season dismissal of football coaches: Statistical 
analysis of causes and consequences, European Journal of Operational Research, 181(1), 362-
373. 
 
Engel, E., Hayes, R. M., and X. Wang, (2003). CEO turnover and properties of accounting 
information. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36, 197-226. 
 
Farrell, K. A. and D. A. Whidbee (2003).  Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO 
turnover and replacement decision, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1-3), 165-196. 
 
Franck, E., Nüesch, S. and J. Pieper (2010).  How expectations affect managerial change, 
Working Papers 0139, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU). 
 
Frederickson, J. W., D.C. Hambrick, and S. Baumrin, (1988). A model of CEO dismissal, 
Academy of Management Review, 13, 255-270. 
 
Holmes, P. (2010).  Win or go home: Why college football coaches get fired, Journal of Sports 
Economics, 11(1), 1-22.   
 
Kahnemann, D. and A. Tversky, (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47, 263-291. 
 
Levitt, S. (2004). Why are gambling markets organized so differently from financial markets? 





Matsunaga, S.R. and C. W. Park (2001). The effect of missing a quarterly earnings benchmark 
on the CEO’s annual bonus. The Accounting Review, 76, 313–332. 
 
Paul, R. and Weinbach, A. (2008a).  Does Sportsbook.com Set Pointspreads to Maximize 
Profits?  Tests of the Levitt Model of Sportsbook Behavior.  Journal of Prediction Markets, 1(3), 
209-218. 
 
Paul, R. and Weinbach, A. (2008b).  Price Setting in the NBA Gambling Market: Tests of the 
Levitt Model of Sportsbook Behavior. International Journal of Sports Finance, 3(3), 2-18. 
 
Paul, R. and Weinbach, A. (2009).  Sportsbook Behavior in the NCAA Football Betting Market: 
Tests of the Traditional and Levitt Models of Sportsbook Behavior.  Journal of Prediction 
Markets, 3(2), 21-37. 
 
Powers, E. A. (2005). Interpreting logit regressions with interaction terms: an application to 
the management turnover literature. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11, 504-522. 
 
Sauer, R. D. (1998). The economics of wagering markets. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(4), 
2021-2064. 
 
Shen, W., Gentgry, R. J. and Tosi, Jr., H. L. (2010). The impact of pay on CEO turnover: A test 
of two perspectives. Journal of Business Research, 63(7), 729-734. Department of Economics, University of Alberta 




2011-13: External Balance Adjustment: An Intra-National and International Comparison - 
Smith 
2011-12: Prize Structure and Performance: Evidence from NASCAR – Frick, Humphreys 
 
2011-11: Spatial Efficiency of Genetically Modified and Organic Crops – Ambec, Langinier, 
Marcoul 
2011-10: Unit Root Testing with Stationary Covariates and a Structural Break in the Trend 
Function - Fossati 
2011-09: CDS as Insurance: Leaky Lifeboats in Stormy Seas – Stephens, Thompson 
 
2011-08: Game Attendance and Competitive Balance in the National Hockey League – 
Coates, Humphreys 
2011-07: Rationalization in the Canadian Retail Gasoline Industry: The Role of Environmental 
Regulations – Eckert, H; Eckert, A 
2011-06: Physical Activity and Health Outcome: Evidence from Canada – Humphreys, 
McLeod, Ruseski 
2011-05: Dating U.S. Business Cycles with Macro Factors – Fossati 
 
2011-04: Covariate Unit Root Tests with Good Size Power – Fossati 
 
2011-03:  New measures of the costs of unemployment: Evidence from the subjective well-
being of 2.3 million Americans – Helliwell, Huang 
2011-02: Childhood Determinants of Risk Aversion: The Long Shadow of Compulsory 
Education – Hryshko, Luengo-Prado,  
2011-01: Will Biofuel Mandates Raise Food Prices? – Chakravorty, Hubert, Moreaux, 
Nostbakken 
2010-20: Does the Retirement Consumption Puzzle Differ Across the Distribution: - Fisher, 
Marchand 
2010-19: A Test of Monopoly Price Dispersion Under Demand Uncertainty – Humphreys, 
Soebbing 
2010-18: Split Incentives and Energy Efficiency in Canadian Multi-Family Dwellings – 
Maruejols, Young 
2010-17: Local Labor Market Impacts of Energy Boom-Bust-Boom in Western Canada - 
Marchand 
2010-16: House Prices and Risk Sharing – Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, Sørensen 
 
2010-15: Education vs. Optimal Taxation: The Cost of Equalizing Opportunities – Stephens 
 
2010-14: The Economic Choice of Participation and Time Spent in Physical Activity and Sport 
in Canada – Humphreys, Ruseski 
2010-13: Do Gamblers Think That Teams Tank? Evidence from the NBA – Soebbing, 
Humphreys 
2010-12: Would Hotelling Kill the Electric Car? – Chakravorty, Leach, Moreaux 
 
2010-11: Residential Land Use Regulation and the US Housing Price Cycle Between 2000 and 
2009 – Huang, Tang 
2010-10: Government Revenue Volatility in Alberta – Landon, Smith C. 
 
Please see above working papers link for earlier papers
www.economics.ualberta.ca 